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PUBLIC POLICY LIMITATIONS ON THE
DEDUCTILIBITY OF FINES AND
PENALTIES: JUDICIAL INERTIA
By VERN KRISHNA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite an aura of settled authority, the scope and extent of public
policy limitations on the deductibility of fines and penalties for income tax
purposes continues to generate litigation. An examination of Canadian judicial
decisions dealing with the question reinforces the conviction that it may be
more important to educate oneself in the obvious than to investigate the ob-
scure. Before making any analysis of the scope of the limitation, one must
determine whether the existence of the public policy doctrine is premised on
judicial authority as is alleged. Only by disposing of this preliminary question
can one proceed to the more controversial issue of canvassing and evaluating
the conflicting policy criteria to provide a framework for implementing the
limitation.
For the purpose of subsequent analysis, it is imperative to clarify two
preliminary points. First, it is assumed for the purpose of this paper that an
amount expended by a taxpayer in payment of a fine or penalty is an amount
which is sufficiently related to the process of earning revenue that it is not
immediately excluded by the statutory prohibition against the deductibility
of personal or living expenses.1 Second, the use of the term "public policy"
in this paper is restricted to what the courts have either declared or assumed
to be public policy outside the express words of the Income Tax Act,2 and
does not extend to any built-in legislative policies reflecting social and eco-
nomic concerns.
The latest decision of the Federal Court dealing with the deductibility of
fines and penalties paid by a taxpayer provides a useful focus for examination
in assessing the two fundamental but controversial issues discussed in this
paper: (1) Is there a public policy limitation based on authority which con-
clusively prohibits the deduction of amounts expended for judicially imposed
fines and penalties in all circumstances? (2) Assuming an affirmative finding
on the first question, has the scope of the doctrine been adequately framed in
the context of relevant criteria?
II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
In Day & Ross Ltd. v. The Queen3 the taxpayer, a New Brunswick
0 Copyright, 1978, Vern Krishna.
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University.
1 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 18 (I)(h).
2 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
3 [1977] 1 F.C. 780, [19761 C.T.C. 707, 76 D.T.C. 6433 (T.D.).
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company engaged in the trucking business, was fined $70,153 during the
taxation years 1966 to 1971 for violation of provincial highway weight-
restriction laws. The taxpayer, in computing its net income for the years in
question, claimed the amount of the penalties imposed as a deduction and
was successful in its claim before the Federal Court, Trial Division. In reach-
ing its conclusion that the fines paid were deductible, the Court approached
the issue of deductibility on the basis of a two-pronged test:
(i) Were the fines an outlay made for the purpose of producing income for the
plaintiff taxpayer so as to meet the requirement of the exception to the
prohibition contained in s. 18(1) (a)? 4
Dub6 J. had little difficulty in accepting that"... the fines paid by the plain-
tiff ... resulted from the day-to-day operation of its transport business and
were paid as a necessary expense .... " This finding in and of itself, it is
submitted, should have been sufficient to decide the question of deductibility
of the penalties paid by the taxpayer.
(ii) Having determined that the fines paid by the taxpayer were deductible on
the first test, could the taxpayer be denied the deduction on the basis of some
"broader principle"?
It is upon this second test that the decision is of interest, because of the ques-
tions it answers and those it leaves unanswered for the future. The Court
concluded that the fines could be deducted and were not precluded from
deductibility on the basis of any "broader principle" applied to the facts of
the case. In reaching this conclusion the Court was influenced by four ele-
ments in the particular fact situation: 6
(a) tight control was impractical, if not impossible in the highly competitive road
transport industry;
(b) the violations were unintentional, in that the taxpayer in many instances
relied on weights declared by customers when loads were picked up en rotle
from factories, potato plants, and fish plants;
(c) the ready availability of advance overweight permits at the request of a
shipper showed that the weight restrictions could easily be overcome; and
(d) the violations were ". . . not outrageous transgressions of public policy."
While the presence of these four elements may have assisted the Court
in determining the particular question at hand, it still remains to be answered
whether the first three were independent criteria or merely indications that
the transgressions were not "outrageous"? Does the decision predict a trend in
the judicial approach towards the elusive doctrine of public policy limitations,
or is it no more than another movement in the wide domain of the shifting
sands of "broader principles"? Should a subsequent Court be prepared to
follow the decision where the facts indicate an intentional violation premised
on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis? Put another way, what if control by
the taxpayer is both practical and possible but is not considered to be desir-
able in an economic sense? Hence, the value of the case for predictive pur-
poses lies in the enunciation of the statement that in certain suitable circum-
stances a taxpayer will not be denied a deduction for a fine imposed by a
4 Id. at 791 (F.C.), 715 (C.T.C.), 6438 (D.T.C.).
5 Id. at 794 (F.C.), 718 (C.T.C.), 6440 (D.T.C.).
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statute merely on the assertion of some "broader principle." However the case
does not provide a framework of analysis to determine the suitability of the
particular circumstances and it leaves unanswered, as indeed it is compelled
to do, the more important question as to the perimeters of those "certain
suitable circumstances." The fact that the decision is not applicable to all
questions of deductibility of fines and penalties is seen in a later decision of
the Tax Review Board in Canadian Motor Sales Corp. v. M.N.R. 7 Here
the Board denied the taxpayer a deduction for a $150,000 penalty imposed
under the Customs Act." This latter case, quite apart from its reiteration of
the nondeductibility of penalties, is interesting in that it brings full circle a
line of reasoning which commenced in England in 1920.9
III. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY FOR NONDEDUCTABILITY
Was it necessary on the strength of authority for Dub6 J. in Day & Ross
Ltd. to rest his conclusion, in part at least, on the basis of any "broader
principle" of public policy? The answer to this question depends on whether
there exists authority for denying deductions of fines on a public policy basis.
It is generally felt that the decision of the English Court of Appeal in LR.C.
v. Alexander Von Glehn & Co.'0 gave birth to the doctrine of a public
policy limitation for income tax deduction purposes. Certainly it remains the
single most cited case in this area, and for that reason alone it is worth exam-
ining." The case concerned the deductibility of a penalty of £e3,000 for
breaches of the orders and proclamations relating to the Customs (War
Powers) Act'2 in connection with certain consignments of goods. The tax-
payer had been exporting goods to neutral countries without taking reason-
able steps to prevent them from reaching enemy countries. The Court of Ap-
peal upheld the decision of the trial Judge and denied the taxpayer a deduc-
tion for the penalty paid in computing net income. Lord Sterndale M.R., in
approaching the question of deductibility, was concerned with the equivalent,
albeit more restrictive, prohibition now contained in paragraph 18(1) (a),13
stating:
I doubt whether the damages in the present case can properly be called a trading
loss... I think that the payment of these damages was not money expended "for
7 [1977] C.T.C. 2037, 77 D.T.C. 30 (T.R.B.).
8 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-40.
9 Nondeductibility of a penalty was actually conceded by counsel for the taxpayer:
see supra note 7, at 2042 (C.T.C.), 34 (D.T.C.).
10 [1920] 2 K.B. 553, [1920] 89 L.J.K.B. 590, [19201 123 L.T. 338, [1919-20] 36
T.L.R. 463 (C.A.).
11 See King Grain & Seed Co. v. M.N.R. (1961), 26 Tax A.B.C. 436, 15 D.T.C.
322; E. H. Pooler & Co. v. M.N.R. (1961), 27 Tax A.B.C. 263, 15 D.T.C. 493; Atomic
Transfer Ltd. v. M.N.R. (1963-64), 34 Tax A.B.C. 451, 18 D.T.C. 153; Tank Truck
Transport Ltd. v. M.N.R. (1965), 38 Tax A.B.C. 332, 19 D.T.C. 504; Minister of Finance
v. Smith, [1927] A.C. 193, [1917-27] C.T.C. 251, 1 D.T.C. 92 (P.C.); Kellogg Co.
of Canada v. M.N.R., [1942] C.T.C. 51, 2 D.T.C. 548 (Ex. Ct.); Espie Printing Co. v.
M.N.R., [1960] Ex. C.R. 422, [1960] C.T.C. 145, 14 D.T.C. 1087, Rolland Paper Co. v.
M.N.R. [1960] Ex. C.R. 334, [1960] C.T.C. 158, 14 D.T.C. 1095; Horton Steel Works
Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1972] C.T.C. 2147, 26 D.T.C. 1123 (T.R.B.).
12 1915, Geo. 5, c. 31 (U.K.).
Is S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
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the purpose of the trade" ... .I do not think that this was connected with or
arising out of such trade, manufacture, adventure, or concern, and still less do
I think that it was a disbursement.. . "wholly and exclusively laid out or ex-
pended for the purpose of such trade ... ."14 (emphasis added)
The other members of the Court of Appeal similarly formulated their deci-
sion on the basis of the "purpose test." Thus, Lord Warrington rested his
conclusion on the basis that
It is not a loss connected with or arising out of the trade .... It is not a com-
mercial loss .... Now it cannot be said that this disbursement was made in any
way for the purpose of the trade or for the purpose of earning the profits of
the trade.15 (emphasis added)
The third member of the Court of Appeal, Scrutton L.J, adopted a similar
approach and answered the particular question "... whether in the case of
these penalties imposed on the traders because they had so acted in export-
ing goods as to break the law, they can say that the penalties were paid for
the purpose of earning profits or were expenditures necessary to earn the
profits ..."-16 by denying deductibility (emphasis added). Admittedly, one
detects an undercurrent of a policy influence in Scrutton L.J.'s comment that
".... I am inclined to think, though I do not wish finally to decide it, that the
Income Tax Acts are to be confined to lawful businesses, and to businesses
carried on in a lawful manner .... ,17 It is dubious, however, whether His
Lordship's reservations, which did not materialize in later judgments,' 8 may
be considered sufficient authority for a public policy limitation.
Clearly, the emphasis of the decision in Alexander Von Glehn0 was on
the "purpose test," the equivalent of which is now found in the prohibition
of paragraph 18(1) (a). It is unfortunate, however, that this line of reason-
ing was derailed by two casual comments when the issue was first presented
in Canada. In Luscoe Products Ltd. v. M.N.R.20 the Canadian taxpayer was
fined $1,000 under the Liquor Control Act2' for marketing a cough remedy
which did not contain sufficient medication to prevent its use as alcohol. The
Board denied deduction of the fine and analysed the issue from the perspec-
tive of whether the expense was one that was incurred for the purpose of
gaining or producing income, and not a payment to acquire or protect capital.
The Board conceded that "... if the expense is one which normally accepted
business practice of the trade or industry concerned recognizes as a necessary
14Supra note 10, at 565 (K.B.), 593 (L.K.B.), 340 (L.T.), 464 (T.L.R.).
15 1d. at 569 (K.B.), 594 (L..K.B.), 342 (L.T.), 464 (T.L.R.).
161d. at 573 (K.B.), 596 (L.K.B.), 343 (L.T.), 464 (T.L.R.).
17ld. at 572 (K.B.), 596 (LJ.K.B.), 343 (L.T.), 464 (T.L.R.).
iSM.N.R. v. Eldridge, [1965] 1 Ex. C.R. 758, [1964] C.T.C. 545, 18 D.T.C. 5338;
Minister of Finance v. Smith, supra note 11.
19 Supra note 10. In basing their decision on the "purpose test," their Lordships
placed substantial reliance on an earlier decision of the House of Lords in Strong & Co.
v. Woodifield, [1906] A.C. 448, [1904-7] All E.R. 953, which examined a similar ques-
tion as to whether a disbursement was expended for the purpose of a trade [Emphasis
added].
20 (1956), 16 Tax A.B.C. 239, 11 D.T.C. 32.
2 1 R.S.O. 1950, c. 210.
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and likely expense and it does not conflict with any specific prohibition in the
Act, it will be allowed .... ,,2
An identical question appeared before the Tax Appeal Board in King
Grain & Seed Co. v. M.N.R.23 The taxpayer had claimed a deduction of $233
with respect to a fine imposed on it for permitting one of its trucks to be
overloaded while travelling on a highway in Michigan. Once again the tax-
payer was denied a deduction. The important question, however, remains:
was the decision premised on the basis of
(i) a finding that the expense was not incurred to earn income, or
(ii) some "broader principle" or public policy?
The judgment leaves the impression that the Board proceeded on the basis
that the expense was not incurred to earn income; this impression is strength-
ened by the Chairman's adoption of the opinion of learned authors that "....
the payments were not incurred for the purpose of earning profits of the
trade .... Now it cannot be said that the disbursement is made in any way
for the purpose of the trade or for the purpose of earning the profits of the
trade."24 This language is virtually identical with that used in the Alexander
Von Glehn case. The Board, however, went further and fastened upon Scrut-
ton L.J.'s comment that the fines were not paid to earn the profits of the trade
but "... were unfortunate incidents which followed after the profits had been
earned ...,25 and thus ignored the concept that profit results from a process
and cycle of business activty, and that net income is the residue remaining
after the deduction of expenses from revenues in any given time period.
In the same judgment the Board examined the decision of the Exchequer
Court in Rolland Paper Co. v. M.N.R.,26 citing it as "the latest authority" on
the subject. The Chairman interpreted that decision stating that it stood
*. . for the proposition that legal expenses incurred in connection with the pre-
sentation of a defence of the commission of an alleged unlawful act are deductible
but it is significant that this judgment does not establish a rule that when a verdict
of guilty is returned the fine imposed by the Court is likewise deductible.27
(emphasis added)
In fact there was nothing significant one way or the other about the fact that
the judgment failed to establish such a rule, since the sole question before the
Exchequer Court in Rolland Paper was the deductibility of legal fees and
nothing else. The taxpayer had in fact paid a fine of $10,000 upon criminal
conviction, but the assessment appealed from related to legal fees paid in
defence of the charge. As Fournier J. characterized the issue:
The question to be determined is whether the legal expenses paid by the appellant
in the amount of $5,984.27 in the year 1955 were made and incurred for the pur-
22 Supra note 20, at 241 (Tax A.B.C.), 34 (D.T.C.).
2 3 Supra note 11.
24Id. at 438 (Tax A.B.C.), 323 (D.T.C.) adopting the statements of Hannon and
Farnsworth, The Principles of Income Taxation (London: Stevens, 1947) at 513.
2 5 Supra note 10, at 572 (K.B.), 595 (LJ.K.B.), 343 (L.T.), 464 (T.L.R.).
2 6 Supra note 11.
27 Supra note 23, at 437 (Tax AB.C.), 323 (D.T.C.).
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pose of gaining income from its business and deductible in computing income... 2 8
(emphasis added)
In both the Luscoe Products and King Grain & Seed decisions the pri-
mary focus of the judgments is on the issue of deductibility determined in
light of whether the expense is one incurred for the purpose of gaining or
producing income and not specifically prohibited by statute. Towards the end
of each judgment, however, there is a passing reference to what may be
characterized as a public policy influence. In Luscoe Products the Vice-Chair-
man had concluded, without any discussion of the policy issues involved,
that ".... It would be preposterous if the appellant company was allowed to
deduct this substantial sum from its assessment and thus be enabled to share
equally with the public revenue the loss to which it was condemned by reason
of its own unlawful act. ."29 Five years later in King Grain & Seed, Cecil L.
Snyder, Q.C., by then Chairman of the Tax Appeal Board, fortified by his
own earlier pronouncement, reiterated on the strength of "... the current
authority of Luscoe Products ... it would be contrary to accepted principles
if the present appellant... was allowed to deduct the amount of this fine ...
from its assessment of taxable income and thus be enabled to share with the
public revenue the loss to which it was condemned by reason of its own negli-
gence . . .0 Thus, both references to public policy were at best casual and
cursory, out of the mainstream of reasoning contained in the body of the judg-
ment, and reflected a concern with subsidizing taxpayers by permitting a de-
duction for fines paid. Nowhere do the judgments refer to any discussion of
the "accepted principles." Given a passing reference to public policy made
out of the mainstream of the reasons for judgment, should these decisions be
taken as definitive authority for a public policy limitation?
It is unfortunate indeed that the Chairman did not lay greater emphasis on
the reasoning process contained in Royal Trust Co. v. M.N.R.31 and Rolland
Paper, both being decisions of the Exchequer Court handed down subsequent
to Luscoe Products and available before the decision of King Grain & Seed.
In Royal Trust, Thorson P. outlined the two-step process which has since
been accepted as the correct statutory approach to deductions from business
income. First, the expenditure should satisfy the commercial and business test
of deductibility in the computation of "profit" under subsection 9 (1); second,
the expenditure cannot fall within the prohibition contained in paragraph
18(1) (a). This process which the learned President first enunciated in Daley
v. M.N.R. 22 was summarized with clarity in Royal Trust as follows:
Thus, in a case under the Income Tax Act if an outlay or expense is made or
incurred by a taxpayer in accordance with the principles of commercial trading
or accepted business practice and it is made or incurred for the purpose of gaining
or producing income from his business its amount is deductible for income tax
purposes.3 3
2 8 Supra note 11, at 336 (Ex. C.R.), 161 (C.T.C.), 1097 (D.T.C.).
29
,Supra note 20, at 242 (Tax A.B.C.), 34 (D.T.C.).
30 Supra note 11, at 438-39 (Tax A.B.C.), 324 (D.T.C.).
31 [1956-60] Ex. C.R. 70, [1957] C.T.C. 32, 11 D.T.C. 1055.
32 [1950] Ex. C.R. 516, [1950] C.T.C. 254, 4 D.T.C. 877.
33 Supra note 31, at 83 (Ex. C.R.), 44 (C.T.C.), 1062 (D.T.C.).
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While the Chairman in King Grain & Seed initially embarked on this statutory
approach to the deductibility of fines, he appears to have been misled by the
opinion of the authors Hannan and Farnsworth, that ".... it seems doubtful
whether fines imposed as a result of an infraction of the law would ever be
regarded as proper deductions no matter what the nature of the business..."4
If this opinion was based on the Alexander Von Glehn decision, as it would
appear to be, then it lacked support in the reasons for judgment of the Court
of Appeal. Reference by the Chairman to the decision of the Exchequer Court
in Espie Printing Co. v. M.N.R.,m decided a year earlier, would have revealed
the proper interpretation to be extracted from Alexander Von Glehn. As
Thurlow J. had earlier observed:
It is noteworthy, however, that the grounds of the decision were not that the
penalty was incurred for doing something illegal in the course of the business but
that the penalty was not a commercial loss and thus not a "loss . . . connected
or arising out of such trade" within the meaning of an exception to a general
statutory prohibition.... 36
His Lordship remained consistent in his approach to a similar question in
M.N.R. v. Pooler and Co., 37 where in deciding that a fine of $2,000 paid
to the Toronto Stock Exchange was not deductible, he did so on the basis
that it had ".... not been established that the outlay or expense in ques-
tion was incurred to any extent for the purpose of gaining or producing in-
come.. ." from the taxpayer's business. 3s Further, he was cautious enough to
steer away from any "broader principle", stating that ". . .[i]n this view, apart
from any broader principle which may or may not be applicable in the parti-
cular circumstances to exclude its deduction, the fine could not.., escape the
prohibition of section 12(1) (a) ....- 39
Notwithstanding the authority of the earlier cases limiting the deductibi-
lity of fines on the bases of a "purpose test," the question of whether a deduc-
tion should be denied on the basis of some wider policy criteria continued to
attract passing reference. Thus, in Atomic Transfer Ltd. v. M.N.R.,40 another
case involving overloaded trucks in contravention of provincial statutes, the
fines were disallowed on the basis that they were ".... not incurred for the
purpose of gaining or producing income within the meaning of paragraph
(a) subsection (1) of section 12 of the Income Tax Act, because they are
not expenses connected with or arising out of trade."41 Here, as in Day &
Ross Ltd., evidence before the Board showed that the taxpayer was in the
business of transportation of general merchandise and it was possible to have
inadvertent overloading. The Board, in addition to determining the question
3 4 Supra note 11, at 438 (C.T.C.), 324 (D.T.C.) quoting Hannon and Farnsworth,
supra note 24.
35 Supra note 11.
36Id. at 431 (Ex. C.R.), 148 (C.T.C.), 1092 (D.T.C.).
37 [19631 Ex. C.R. 16, [19621 C.T.C. 527, 16 D.T.C. 1321.
381d. at 23 (Ex. C.R.), 533 (C.T.C.), 1324 (D.T.C.).
39 Id. at 22 (Ex. C.R.), 532 (C.T.C.), 1324 (D.T.C.).
4o Supra note 11.
41 1d. at 452 (Tax A.B.C.), 154 (D.T.C.).
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on the basis of the "purpose test," made a passing reference that ".... it
would be against public policy to allow such penalties or fines even if a profit
resulted," 42 without any citation of authority or exploration of public policy
considerations.
Hence it is clear that, commencing with a casual statement, the public
policy doctrine has through a process of self-serving repetition been elevated
to the stature of authority, with its foundation as secure as that of an inverted
pyramid. It is unfortunate, indeed, that the Tax Appeal Board did not heed
the caution of Judge Learned Hand that it is not desirable for a lower court
to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may
be in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant.43
A rigorous analysis of the cases denying the deuctibility of fines in the
computation of net income reveals two traits. First, the articulated ratio com-
mon to the decisions is the application of the "purpose test" now contained
in the prohibition of paragraph 18 (1) (a). It is a long leap from that position
to infer as a matter of law, as Revenue Canada has done, that the Courts
have formulated a conclusive proposition that all "... fines or penalties which
arise out of judicial proceedngs are not allowed as deduction[s] from in-
come .... ,44 Rather, the ratio of the earlier cases should be restrictively
interpreted as to particular factual situations, and the "purpose test" itself
viewed as a question of factual determination. As observed earlier, the Federal
Court in Day & Ross Ltd. had no difficulty in finding as a question of fact
that "... the fines paid by the plaintiff ... resulted from the day-to-day
operation of its transport business and were paid as a necessary expense. '45
This approach reinforces the view that paragraph 18(1) (a) has tended to
attract a more liberal interpretation with the passage of time.
Second, a passing reference may be found in some of the decisions to
that "broader principle" known as public policy. Not one of the decisions
contains any analysis of the "broader principles," and any public policy limi-
tation, if one exists in authority, is found as an appendage to a judgment
which concentrates its legal analysis elsewhere. Indeed it is likely that the
courts have deliberately camouflaged the public policy issues behind the lan-
guage of the "purpose test" contained in the statutory prohibition of para-
graph 18(1) (a).
It may be suggested that since the end result is the same, whether it be
premised on the "purpose test" of paragraph 18(1) (a) or on an inarticulated
public policy doctrine, it serves little purpose to distinguish between the two
to determine the reasons for disallowance. Such an approach has a certain
superficial appeal. While the "purpose test" serves the net income concept
that it was intended to serve, the test itself has evolved in a statutory setting.
Hence, the old test of "wholly exclusively and necessarily" found in sub-
42 1d.
43 Spector Motor Service Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809 at 823 (2d Cir. 1944).
44 Can.: Department of National Revenue, Interpretation Bulletin IT-104, "De-
ductibility of Fines and Penalties" (Ottawa, May 30, 1973) paragraph 6.
45 Supra note 3, at 794 (F.C.), 718 (C.T.C.), 6440 (D.T.C.).
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section 6(a) of Income War Tax Act46 has given way to the more liberal
phrasing of paragraph 18(1) (a). Again, the "purpose test" is one which may
be used to evaluate a given fact situation. In contrast, a limitation based on
an inarticulated notion of public policy, albeit potentially flexible, tends in
fact to be applied in a rigid manner. Further, the premises of the public policy
doctrine as applied in Canadian tax cases dealing with the deductibility of
fines and penalties remain undefined and unanalysed. In this undefined state
the doctrine may be used as an instrument of moral stricture a deterrent
mechanism, without regard to its impact on the policy of taxing statutes and
the purpose which tax policy seeks to serve.
IV. TAX POLICY CRITERIA
When one shifts the focus of attention from the proposition here sub-
mitted, that there is no adequate authority for a blanket policy denial of
deductions for all fines and penalties, to search for an adequate discussion of
the considerations to be evaluated in formulating a "broader principle" (if
such a principle is considered desirable at all), one is immediately impressed
by the void in judicial analysis of this question in Canadian tax decisions.
This absence of analysis is both unfortunate and understandable: unfortunate
in that judicial decisions founded on so-called "accepted principles" create an
aura of reasoned consideration and evaluation where none exists; understand-
able in that tax policy analysis attracts little attention in the arena of litiga-
tion and should perhaps be best left to a legislative forum. Any discussion of
a doctrine of public policy in tax matters, be it founded on statutory or com-
mon law authority, must view the policy issues from two perspectives. First
is the perspective of tax policy itself and the purposes it seeks to serve. Second
is the policy of the statute which, upon being violated, gives rise to the fine or
penalty.
"Tax policy" itself is merely a convenient label attached to a multitude
of tax objectives which are often in conflict with each other. While the objec-
tives of tax policy may at times be in conflict, the underlying premise of a tax
structure, to levy a tax on the net income of a taxpayer, has long been set-
tled in Canada,47 the U.S. and U.K. The premise itself is derived from the
concept of "income," which has been best described by the Haig-Simons
formulation of the net accretion of economic power between two points in
time.48 Thus, the primary thrust of the taxing statute is to levy a tax on the
net realized income of a taxpayer which represents a pragmatic adaptation of
the net accretion to wealth concept. If one accepts as a starting point this
notion of taxation of net income, it is readily apparent that prima facie any
denial of a business expense, whether it be legitimate, illegal, immoral or
otherwise, shifts the structural foundation of the taxing statute. This is not
46 R.S.C. 1927, c. 97.
47 See generally the jurisprudence under s. 9(1) and s. 18(1)(a) Income Tax Act,
supra note 2 and predecessor sections.
4 8 R. M. Haig, "The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects," in Haig,
ed., The Federal Income Tax (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921); Henry
Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal
Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
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to suggest that such a shift is not permissible, but merely to argue for an
exercise of caution before making a structural adjustment - such caution
being manifested by informed analysis. Prima facie any denial of an expense
which has been made or incurred for the purpose of earning revenue, moves
the structural foundation of the taxing statute in the direction of imposing a
tax on gross income. Since the shift is at variance with the fundamental pre-
mise of the tax structure, it should be clearly justified, articulated, and per-
mitted, if at all, in narrowly delineated circumstances. Such was the approach
of Mr. Justice Stewart in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tellier where
he stated "... we start with the proposition that the federal income tax is a
tax on net income, not a sanction against wrongdoing ... One familiar facet
of the principle is the truism that the statute does not concern itself with the
lawfulness of the income that it taxes...."50
Since the concept of net income is one founded on its component parts
of revenue and expenses, it may serve the purpose of analysis to examine the
tax treatment of revenue from an illegal business or activity, illegal expenses
incurred in pursuit of a legal business, and expenses incurred in pursuit of
an illegal business, in an attempt to extract a rationale for the tax treatment
afforded these various items of revenue and expenses; then to inquire whether
this rationale is applicable to the question of whether fines and penalties
should be deductible. As to the first item, revenue from an unlawful business,
there appears to be no doubt at all that moral and ethical considerations will
not exclude income from such illegal activities from being brought into in-
come. As Viscount Haldane put the position of the Privy Council in Minister
of Finance v. Smith:
There is nothing in the Act which points to any intention to curtail the statutory
definition of income, and it does not appear appropriate under the circumstances
to impart any assumed moral or ethical standard as controlling in a case such as
this the literal interpretation of the language employed.r1
It is clear then, at least on the revenue side, inclusion is not precluded by the
illegality of the revenue generating activity and the notion of income as being
an accretion to wealth is preserved. 52
The second item concerns illegal expenses incurred in the conduct of a
legal business. Should the taint of illegality preclude the deductibility of the
expense? The Minister attempted in one such situation to persuade the Ex-
chequer Court in Espie Printing5 3 to deny the taxpayer a deduction on the
49 The concept of realization modified by statute in some situations in order to
serve other objectives, e.g., s. 70(5), Income Tax Act, supra note 2.
50 383 U.S. 687 at 691 (2d. Cir. 1966).
51 Supra note 11, at 197 (A.C.), 254 (C.T.C.), 93 (D.T.C.). This decision has been
applied in Canada in King v. Gooderham and Worts [1928] 62 O.L.R. 218, [1928] 3
D.L.R. 109 (C.A.); King v. Carling Export Brewing Co., [1929] Ex. C.R. 130, 1 D.T.C.
146, and judicially noted in Riedle Brewery Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1939] Ex. C.R. 314, [1938-
39] C.T.C. 304, 1 D.T.C. 430.
52 M.N.R. v. Eldridge, supra note 18, at 766 (Ex. C.R.), 551 (C.T.C.), 5342
(D.T.C.).
53 Supra note 11.
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basis of a sweeping assertion of public policy. The Court rejected the Min-
ister's suggestion and permitted a deduction on the basis of the concept of
"net income," stating that the expression ".... 'net profit or gain' ... con-
noted not gross receipts from a business but gross receipts less the expenses
incurred to obtain such receipts... ."5 Having satisfied himself that the ex-
penses were deductible under the concept of net income, Thurlow J. con-
sidered the fact of illegality to be irrelevant in determining whether the ex-
pense was or was not incurred for the purpose of earning income. It was the
"purpose test" and the concept of "net income" which prevailed, with Thur-
low J. stating:
For my part, I do not see how the illegality of the arrangements with the em-
ployees or of the payments has any bearing on the question whether these wages
were wholly, exclusively, and necessarily laid out or expended for the purpose
of earning the income. Whether the expense was or was not so incurred seems
to me to be a question on which the illegality or otherwise of the payments or of
the arrangements under which they were made leads to no conclusion one way
or the other .... I do not see how the net profit or gain can be properly com-
puted without deducting such expenses whether they or some of them bear the
taint of illegality or not.55 (emphasis added)
The third category contemplated involves those situations where the ex-
pense has been incurred in the pursuit of an illegal business. This category
contains two situations which should be approached separately. First, those
expenses incurred in connection with an illegal business, but which are not
inherently illegal. Second, those expenditures incurred in an illegal business
activity, which are inherently illegal. An opportunity to judicially consider
the deductibility of both of these types of expenses arose in M.N.R. v. Eld-
ridge, where the taxpayer was engaged in running a call girl operation and
freely admitted the illegal nature of the business.56 The Minister's Notices of
Assessment allowed for the deduction of certain expenses, e.g., wages of
telephone operators, telephone, room rentals, refreshments, taxis, bad debts, 57
in arriving at the taxpayer's taxable income. The dispute before the Exchequer
Court involved the taxpayer's claim for additional deductions with respect to
expenses incurred. These expenses involved both of the types described
above. Those which were not inherently illegal included items of rent, legal
fees, bail bond fees, etc. Also claimed were expenses which may be considered
inherently illegal, such as alleged bribes paid to members of the law enforce-
ment authorities for protection, and alleged bribes made to officials of the
civic administration. 8
In considering the deductibility of the first category of expenses-those
not inherently illegal-Cattanach I. had no difficulty in permitting the tax-
payer deduction where the taxpayer satisfied the Court as to the authenticity
541d. at 431 (Ex. C.R.), 154 (C.T.C.), 1092 (D.T.C.), citing as authority Imperial
Oil Ltd. v. M.N.R. [1947] Ex. C.R. 527, [1947] C.T.C. 353, 13 D.T.C. 1034; and Daley
v. M.N.R., supra note 32.
55Id. at 432 (Ex. C.R.), 155 (C.T.C.), 1093 (D.T.C.).
56 Supra note 18, at 766 (Ex. C.R.), 551 (C.T.C.), 5342 (D.T.C.).
57 d. at 765 (Ex. C.R.), 547 (C.T.C.), 5341 (D.T.C.).
58 Id. at 771 (Ex. C.R.), 556 (C.T.C.), 5344 (D.T.C.).
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of the payments. In allowing the deductions the Court was quite obviously
adhering to the concept of taxation on the basis of net income. It is the treat-
ment of the second category of expense-those inherently illegal-which
leaves some unanswered questions. It is clear that in denying the taxpayer
her deductions for the alleged bribes, Cattanach J. proceeded on the basis of
an absence of proof stating that:
The evidence which I received was not of this nature and accordingly I have not
been satisfied that payments for protection were made . . . .I have not been
convinced that these gifts were, in fact, made and even if they were made, no
evidence has been adduced from which I could ascertain the number of such gifts
and so compute their value.59
Having dispensed with the issue before the Court on the basis that the tax-
payer failed to discharge the onus of proof, it was not necessary for Cattanach
. to consider the question in the context of public policy limitations. His
Lordship certainly left a strong inference that, had he been satisfied as to the
authenticity of the alleged bribes, he would have been inclined to permit de-
duction. Not having been called upon to definitively answer the question it is
dubious whether this inference can be raised to the status of a ratio sub silentio.
The common characteristic of the three categories discussed, namely,
revenue from an illegal business, illegal expenses of a legal business, and ex-
penses incurred in an illegal business, is that the tax treatment afforded the
items either conforms to a notion of income as being an accretion to wealth
in the case of revenue inclusion, or to the concept of net income in the latter
two situations. (Net income itself is no more than a derivative of the net
accretion of wealth concept.) That this net income concept is fundamental to
the tax structure cannot be overemphasized. If the concept is to be preserved
and promoted as being one which is considered desirable, does it permit the
denial of an expense deduction on the basis of some "broader principle"?
Further, if it is deemed desirable that "broader principles" supersede tax
policy considerations, should this be achieved legislatively or judicially?
It is difficult to appreciate the logical consistency of permitting the de-
duction of an illegal expense in a legal business or the deduction of an ex-
pense of an illegal business on the rationale that it conforms to a concept of
net income, while at the same time denying a deduction for a penalty im-
posed due to that same illegality. At the very least, internal consistency would
demand equivalent treatment of a penalty imposed for an illegal act as an
expense incurred for an illegal business. From a purely structural point of
view, the deduction of both expenses incurred in illegal businesses and penal-
ties imposed for illegal acts, should be considered deductible. Since the In-
come Tax Act is structured on a modified concept of net accretion to wealth,
it is possible to suggest that illegal gains and illegal expenses share a common
bond. Thus, revenue from an illegal activity is included in the tax base since
it enhances the taxpayer's wealth. At the same time, expenditures which re-
duce the taxpayer's wealth should be deducted from the tax base in order to
provide a reasonably accurate assessment of a taxpayer's net accretion to
wealth. Inclusion of the former and denial of deduction for the latter would
59 Id.
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cause a structural shift in the underlying foundation of the taxing statute.
Such a shift should only be made, if at all, on the basis of a well-reasoned
analysis of the public policy criteria.
V. PUBLIC POLICY CRITERIA
To this juncture the discussion in this paper has focused on the absence
of common law authority to universally preclude the deduction of fines and
penalties imposed for contravention of non taxing statutes, and an examina-
tion of tax policy arguments calling for consistent adherence to a concept of
net income. It remains to be discussed whether from the perspective of some
wider public policy, a structural shift in tax policy should be consistently ap-
plied to deny both the expense and the penalty, and the appropriate vehicle
for implementing such a radical shift. That the Income Tax Act is used to
implement policies other than that of revenue generation is beyond debate.00
These policies have traditionally embraced, albeit with varying degrees of
enthusiasm, the redistribution of wealth, as well as social and economic
measures. The question remains whether tax statutes should further public
policy, however defined, and if so, what should be the appropriate forum to
analyse and debate such public policy. While it serves the purpose of provid-
ing a convenient label, public policy itself is a hybrid and elusive notion. In
the context of deductions of penalties incurred as a consequence of business
activity, it may include moral and ethical considerations, mechanisms intend-
ed to deter or stimulate particular forms of conduct considered detrimental
or beneficial, and economic value judgments.
Moral and ethical considerations, perhaps of necessity, remain the most
elusive input into the development of public policy. Rarely articulated in the
context of tax decisions, they may be indiscriminately injected into argument
without elaboration. Day & Ross Ltd. illustrates the inherent danger of this
process where counsel for the Crown submitted that "... there is a broader
principle which would exclude the deduction of a fine incurred by the tax-
payer, either in the course of business, or otherwise . .. ."1 In support of this
suggestion, the Crown made reference to various English decisions, notably
Beresford v. Royal Insurance Coi s quoting Lord Atldn, that, "... the
absolute rule is that the Courts will not recognize a benefit accruing to a cri-
minal from his crime."e
Is is important, however, in evaluating the perimeters of an "absolute
rule" to bear in mind both the context in which, and the social milieu pre-
vailing, when the statement was made. Beresford involved the payment on
an insurance policy to the personal representative of a person who had com-
mitted suicide. In that particular era, suicide was characterized as a heinous
60 Can.: Department of Finance, Budget Document (Ottawa: March 31, 1977) at
32 where the Minister of Finance identifies, inter alia, economic stimulation, regional
development, equity, and tax simplification as the specific objectives that guided the
choice of the measures put forward [Emphasis added].
61 Supra note 3, at 792 (F.C.), 716 (C.T.C.), 6439 (D.T.C.).
62 [1938] A.C. 586, [19381 2 All E.R. 602.
03 Id. at 599 (A.C.), 607 (All E.R.).
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crime and Lord Atkin was influenced by the characterization of the times,
as evidenced by his reliance on Sir John Jervis' statement that "... self mur-
der is wisely and religiously considered by the English law as the most heinous
description of felonious homicide." 64 His Lordship went on to state that
".... the suicide is a felon: on the inquisition his goods were forfeited (though
apparently not his lands)."6 Earlier in the judgment, Lort Atkin referred to
In the Estate of Crippens,6 which was concerned with the administration of
the estate of a deceased wife who had been murdered by her husband, and
to Hall v. Knight and Baxter67 where on the strength of public policy a bene-
ficiary found guilty of manslaughter was denied from taking under the will.
The Minister also made reference to Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Assoc.68 and the statement of Fry L.J contained therein:
It appears to me that no system of jurisprudence can with reason include amongst
the rights which it enforces rights directly resulting to the person asserting them
from the crime of that person.69
It should be kept in mind that the case involved suit on a life policy where
the beneficiary of the policy had been convicted of murder of the assured.
It appears reasonable from the context of these cases that Lord Atkin's
"absolute rule" was intended to apply to the prevailing societal perception of
heinous crimes. Further, it is dubious whether the reasoning of a judicial tri-
bunal in 1938 can, indiscriminately and without modification, be applied
forty years later and ignore the proliferation of statutes and regulations in
the past two decades. Public policy inherently involves notions that are un-
certain and fluctuating, varying with changing economic needs, social cus-
toms, and the moral aspirations of a people. In such a setting, "absolute
rules" serve merely to entrench the perceptions of the past and discourage
examination in the context of present needs. Although Dub6 J. in Day & Ross
Ltd. does not specifically reject the notion of an absolute rule, His Lordship
leaves the impression that he would at the very least distinguish situations
involving "outrageous transgressions of public policy" from lesser violations. 70
Again, it may be suggested that the allowance of a deduction for a fine
reduces the ultimate impact or "sting" of the penalty by permitting the tax-
payer to reduce the after-tax cost of the penalty, thereby reducing the deter-
rent value of the penal provision in the statute violated by the taxpayer. This
argument represents the single most persuasive reason for the disallowance
of penalty deductions, and rests on the implicit premise that in such matters
the tax objective of economic neutrality should be subservient to the general
interests of society as reflected in its statutes and regulations. The argument
is a powerful one indeed, until it is turned around to ask whether the denial
of a deduction may have the ultimate effect of increasing a civil or criminal
64Id.
65 Id.
66 [1911] P. 108, [1911-131 All E.R. 207.
67 [1914] P. 1.
68 [18921 1 Q.B. 147, 61 LJ.Q.B. 128, 66 L.T. 220.
69 Id. at 156 (Q.B.), 133 (L.J.Q.B.), 224 (L.T.).
7OSupra note 3, at 795 (F.C.), 718 (C.T.C.), 6440 (D.T.C.).
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penalty, which may or may not have been intended by the legislative policy
behind the statute violated. Thus, it is conceivable that indiscriminate judicial
application of a public policy limitation to all situations may cause the legis-
lative policy behind an enactment to be varied in an unintended manner. For
this reason alone, the development of any public policy limitations would be
best left to a legislative forum which could consider the question in a wider
framework than that which is possible in an adversary proceeding. The danger
of judicial distortion of legislative policy is more acute where the policy has
been applied without any analysis, as is the experience in Canadian tax
decisions.
A variation of the "reduced sting" argument is one which suggests that
allowance of a deduction would result in the ultimate cost, albeit a reduced
cost, to be felt differently by taxpayers. Thus, a high marginal rate taxpayer
would bear a lesser net after tax cost than one with a lower marginal rate.
The converse must, of course, hold equally true. The effect of disallowance is
to differentiate between the high marginal rate taxpayer who pays the penalty
from more expensive after-tax dollars than his low marginal rate counterpart.
Arguments based on the phenomena of differential impacts offer little towards
a resolution of the public policy issue in that the cause of the differential im-
pact is the rate structure, which is unrelated to the public policy question of
deductibility.
Again it may be suggested, as indeed it was by the Board in both Luscoe
and King Grain & Seed, that allowance of a deduction would not only reduce
the sting of the penalty, but would permit the taxpayer's penalty to be "sub-
sidized" and thus shift the tax burden to other taxpayers. If, however, allow-
ance of any business expense incurred for the purpose of earning income is
viewed as a "subsidy," the impact here is no different from that observed else-
where in the Act. Thus, the allowance of a deduction for an illegal expense
incurred in the conduct of a lawful activity, or an expense incurred in pursuit
of an illegal business would similarly have the effect of a "subsidy." Ulti-
mately, the "subsidy theory" must surely rely for its legitimacy on some in-
articulated premise that all income of a taxpayer belongs to the Crown, and
that whatever the Crown does not retain is converted into a subsidy for the
taxpayer.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two questions emerge from the preceding discussion: (a) Should the
tax structure be judicially molded to serve as an ancillary instrument to further
"penalize" or "subsidize" taxpayers? (b) If tax policy is to be considered
subservient to general public policy, should this be achieved in a judicial
forum without legislative deliberation? It has been argued that, at least in
Canada, the notion of a blanket public policy limitation on the deduction of
all fines and penalties lacks any foundation based on authority. Further, quite
apart from authority, so called "accepted" and "broader" principles have
never been analysed, rarely discussed, and usually fervently followed by judi-
cial tribunals. It remains impossible to determine the extent and scope of the
limitation in its currently concealed state, and exposure of the doctrine to
judicial and legislative consideration may serve its development.
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Inherent in the difficulty of development of the doctrine are the opposing
pulls of tax policy and "broader principles." Indiscriminate application of
these "broader principles" distorts the underlying tax policy to levy a tax on
the net income of a taxpayer. At the same time, denial of a deduction attaches
a serious punitive consequence without express or implied legislative approval.
To suggest that universal disallowance of all fines can be justified on the basis
of some presumed intention of every legislative and quasi-legislative forum in
this country stretches the limits of credulity.
Given the elusive nature of a public policy doctrine, whether it be pre-
mised on moral, ethical, deterrent, or tax subsidy considerations or some com-
bination thereof, suggests that the doctrine be legislatively considered in order
to define its rationale and stipulate its limits. Advocacy of a legislative ap-
proach does not suggest that any judicial input into the development of public
policy is eradicated: rather, that judicial application of a public policy limita-
tion should be constrained to those "outrageous transgressions" where Lord
Atkin's "absolute rule" would clearly accord with societal interests and ex-
pectations without specific legislative articulation.
As a preliminary distinction, judicial denial of deductions both for those
expenses which are inherently illegal and fines resulting from such illegal acti-
vities could be justified on the basis of larger societal interests without legisla-
tive specification. The term "illegal" should be limited to those offences which
are contained in the Criminal Code.71 While many offences fall outside the
Code, the Code does represent, at the very least, the lowest common deno-
minator of what society considers undesirable conduct. Any further restric-
tions on the deductibility of fines would be better left to a Parliamentary
forum for evaluation of the conflicting criteria applicable. Such a forum would
be better equipped to consider the nature and quantum of a penalty provision
and the legislative policy behind the enactment.
While it is premature to determine the length and the intensity of the
shadow cast by Day & Ross Ltd., it is probably time to bring the doctrine of
public policy limitations on tax deductibility within the sphere of legislative
evaluation and control.
71 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
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